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Gestation, Equality and Freedom: 
Ectogensis as a Political Perspective  
 
ABSTRACT 
The benefits of full ectogenesis, i.e. the gestation of human foetuses outside the maternal 
womb, for women ground many contemporary authors’ arguments on the ethical desirability 
of this practice. In this paper, I present and assess two sets of arguments advanced in favour of 
ectogenesis: arguments stressing ectogenesis’ equality-promoting potential and arguments 
stressing its freedom-promoting potential. I argue that albeit successfully grounding a positive 
case for ectogenesis, these arguments have limitations in terms of their reach and scope. 
Concerning their limited reach, I contend that ectogenesis will likely benefit only a small subset 
of women and, arguably, not the group who most need to achieve equality and freedom. 
Concerning their limited scope, I contend that these defences do not pay sufficient attention to 
the context in which ectogenesis would be developed and that, as a result, they risk leaving the 
status quo unchanged. After providing examples of these limitations, I move to my proposal 
concerning the role of ectogenesis in promoting women’s equality and freedom. This proposal 
builds on Silvia Federici’s, Mariarosa Dalla Costa’s and Selma James’ readings of the 
international feminist campaign ‘Wages for Housework’. It maintains that the political 
perspective and provocation that ectogenesis can advance should be considered and defended.  
 
INTRODUCTION: A(N ARGUABLY) DESIRABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS  
Imagine for a moment that it is possible to beget children without placing any kind of burden 
on women. Imagine a world where the health-related risks associated with pregnancy and 
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childbirth have become obsolete. A world where the dietary and lifestyle changing behaviours 
necessary to maximise the chances of having healthy pregnancies would no longer be 
necessary. A world without the financial losses associated with maternity leave, and where the 
obstacles to career-advancement that women currently face to gestate and give birth to children 
have disappeared. This arguably desirable state of affairs is what full ectogenesis1 (henceforth 
‘ectogenesis’2), namely the gestation of human foetuses outside the maternal womb from 
conception to ‘birth’, may be able to deliver.  
Ectogenesis is currently not technically possible. However, following Peter Singer and Deane 
Wells, one could argue that “the period in which it is necessary for the human fetus to be in its 
mother’s womb is shrinking from both sides” [2]. Experiments in embryology are pushing 
forward the time in which embryos can be sustained in vitro (on one side) while developments 
in non-human animals are pushing back the viability threshold (on the other side). The former 
set of experiments has demonstrated that embryos can be sustained in vitro for 12-13 days 
[3,4]. This is longer than was hitherto technically possible and closer to the 14-day statutory 
limit to sustain embryos in vitro [5]. On the other side, experiments in non-human animals have 
demonstrated that organisms such as lambs can be removed from the maternal womb and 
transferred in ‘biobags’ mimicking the condition of late-stage gestation [6]. In these 
experiments, lambs have been removed at the corresponding viability threshold in humans (110 
days for lambs, corresponding to 22-24 weeks for humans). The aims of this research are to 
better understand the conditions that enable extremely premature infants to survive outside the 
maternal womb and to improve their chances of survival. Taken together, developments in 
human embryology and in the extrauterine gestation of non-human animals are narrowing the 
 
1 In this paper, I refer to ‘full ectogenesis’ as the gestation of human foetuses outside the maternal womb from 
conception to ‘birth’. ‘Partial ectogenesis’ instead refers to the extrauterine gestation of a foetus after being 
removed from the maternal womb.  
2 For an interesting terminological and conceptual analysis, see Elizabeth C. Romanis [1] 
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time that organisms need to gestate in the maternal womb. Pace Singer and Wells, however, 
(full) ectogenesis currently remains a theoretical possibility. While such timeframe is indeed 
narrowing, technical, legal and ethical challenges remain to be addressed to shrink it further. 
One could then argue that the focus of the ethical debate should rather be on partial ectogenesis.  
Despite this, this paper deliberately focuses on full rather than partial ectogenesis and on the 
normative arguments advanced in defence of this practice3. Many of these defences are 
grounded on the transformative potential of ectogenesis, and it is full rather than partial 
ectogenesis that is arguably more likely to transform gestation and childbirth [7]. My analysis 
takes as a point of departure these defences and questions whether ectogenesis can truly deliver 
on the transformative potential that they ascribe to it. In what follows, I present and discuss 
liberal arguments in favour of ectogenesis that emphasise its equality-promoting and freedom-
promoting potential. Contra these defences, I contend that the true value of ectogenesis lies in 
the broader political perspective that it can advance. My analysis is conceptually and 
normatively women-centred in that it bypasses other potentially sound defences of ectogenesis 
that take foetuses or other parties into consideration. 
 
 
TWO SETS OF ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF ECTOGENESIS  
The normative literature on ectogenesis has produced several defences of this practice. I 
distinguish two sets of arguments that have been advanced in favour of ectogenesis from the 
point of view of women. The first set of arguments stresses the equality-promoting potential of 
 
3 Benefits and promises of ectogenesis are at the centre of past [8] and contemporary [9] defences of this practice, 
and arguments showing how it ought to be regarded as a moral imperative [10]. Other than for its benefits for 
women, ectogenesis has been defended as it could provide a “safer, albeit more artificial” [11] environment for 
foetuses and as a ‘solution’ to the divisions and controversy surrounding abortion. This latter claim is however 
highly contested [12–16]. 
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this practice [2,8–12]. Roughly, it points to the increased equality between men and women 
both in the private sphere (at home) and in the workplace that ectogenesis would make possible. 
It also points to ectogenesis’ potential to increase equality among women. Ectogenesis would 
enable women who are facing biological and social constraints to reproduce to have genetically 
related children. The second set of arguments stresses the freedom-promoting potential of 
ectogenesis [9,13–15]. It refers on the one hand to the freedom from the burdens, restrictions, 
controls and potential harms of pregnancy and childbirth. On the other, it draws on the principle 
of reproductive freedom to show that ectogenesis would expand women’s significant range of 
options and enable them to pursue their preferred parenthood project. I present these two sets 
of arguments in the next sections.  
 
Ectogenesis as Equality-Promoting  
The argument that ectogenesis could promote equality and redress natural inequalities begins 
with the appreciation that there are fundamental inequalities between men and women [8–10] 
and among women [8]. Some of the inequalities between men and women are directly caused 
by biological differences and women’s unique capacity to beget children. According to this 
view, women carry all the burdens associated with biological reproduction: they bear physical 
burdens associated with gestation and childbirth [8,9,16]; they could suffer from physical and 
mental health issues during gestation, birth and post-delivery [17–21]; they could be subjected 
to complications of childbirth that can and often do result in death [22,23]; they are exposed to 
external control, monitoring and choice-restricting measures [8–10]; and they are likely to 
experience threats to bodily integrity and personal privacy [8–10]. By contrast, men can 
become biological fathers without being exposed to any of these risks and burdens. Ectogenesis 
would be equality-promoting in that it would enable women to become mothers in the same 
way that men do, by reaping the benefits of having genetically related children while not 
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experiencing the burdens associated with gestation and childbirth. For instance, following the 
work of radical feminist Shulamith Firestone, Singer and Wells argue that ectogenesis “can be 
supported on the ground that it would make a fundamental contribution toward sexual equality” 
[2]. Similarly, Tuija Takala emphasises that “if and when ectogenesis becomes a safe option it 
will finally make true equality between humans possible” [11]. The strongest case for 
ectogenesis in this respect is arguably Evie Kendal’s, who contends that: 
When added to the unequal distribution of the physical, social and financial 
burdens associated with pregnancy and childbirth, the claim that reproductive 
difference constitutes a fundamental inequality between the sexes becomes 
especially convincing [8]  
According to the author, this represents a prima facie reason in favour of ectogenesis due to 
the potential of this practice to redress such inequalities.  
In addition, ectogenesis could redress inequalities that are indirectly caused by biological 
differences and women’s unique capacity to beget children [10,15]. Arguably, the burdens and 
responsibilities associated with social reproduction, namely the sets of arrangements that 
enable a society to reproduce itself, such as domestic labour, pregnancies and childrearing, are 
currently largely borne by women [24–26]. Following proponents of the equality-promoting 
potential of this practice, the burdens and responsibilities of social reproduction are placed on 
women due to their unique role in biological reproduction. Since ectogenesis enables the 
disentanglement of biological and social reproduction, the argument goes, it would succeed in 
redressing inequalities where other attempts to do so fail. The burdens and responsibilities of 
social reproduction would be more equally shared between men and women [8,11]. For 
instance, Kendal argues that “ectogenesis could also provide a means of procreating that 
prevents many women from slipping into the regressive social norms governing childrearing” 
[8]. Similarly, Takala contends that ectogenesis would remove the biggest difference between 
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the sexes, as it would “take away the grounds for oppression and eventually, lead to true 
equality”[11]. These views defend ectogenesis on the grounds that it has the potential to 
promote equality not only in begetting children but also in childrearing, which makes possible 
increased equality in the private sphere (i.e. at home).  
Another sort of male-female equality that ectogenesis promotes is in the workplace. According 
to this view, women’s unique role in begetting children condemns them to a less competitive 
role in the labour market, fewer career advancements, less remuneration and from accessing 
certain professions [11,16]. Authors defending ectogenesis as an equality-promoting practice 
contend that these disadvantages and impediments to achieving full equality in the workplace 
are due to the breaks that women need to take to gestate children (due to their role in biological 
reproduction) and to fulfil childrearing responsibilities (due to their role in social reproduction). 
Ectogenesis would redress such inequalities by making women equally able to compete in the 
labour market [8,12]; to access certain professions requiring exposure to substances that can 
have teratogenic effects; and to fulfil roles that women cannot fulfil whilst gestating children 
due to their physical demandingness [8]. 
Lastly, ectogenesis is defended on the grounds that it would promote equality among fertile, 
infertile, homosexual and trans sexual women [8]. Ectogenesis enables women who are 
currently unable to gestate and birth children for social or biological reasons to have children 
in the same way as fertile women (i.e. having children who are genetically related to them). 
This would equalise reproductive capacities in these different groups. For instance, ectogenesis 
could enable women with age-related infertility to have genetically related children. It could 
also enable women who have undergone chemotherapy or a hysterectomy and have become 
infertile as a result to have children as other biologically fertile women currently do. For all 
these women, ectogenesis would promote equality between them and other biologically fertile 
women.  
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Ectogenesis as Freedom-Promoting  
Several defences of ectogenesis are grounded in the liberating role and potential that this 
practice could have for women [15,16]. It is hence not surprising then that the second set of 
arguments advanced in favour of ectogenesis revolves around its potential to promote women’s 
freedom. A first way in which ectogenesis would achieve this is by freeing women from all the 
risks and burdens associated with gestating, birthing and rearing children [8,9,13]. Ectogenesis 
would be, in Firestone’s words, a means of “freeing women from the tyranny of their sexual-
reproductive roles” [13]. For instance, Anna Smajdor argues that: 
[F]or expectant mothers, the fact of encompassing another life in their bodies 
often takes a serious toll on their autonomy. Pregnant women are routinely 
expected to subsume their appetites and desires into those that would be in 
keeping with the well-being of the fetus [9]  
Ectogenesis would remove this ‘serious toll’ on women’s autonomy by enabling them to have 
genetically related children whose well-being during gestation would not be achieved at 
significant costs to their mothers’ freedom. Kendal makes a similar point by stressing how 
women’s bodily integrity is severely compromised during gestation and how the social, 
financial and health-related burdens associated with gestation restrict women’s freedom. These 
narratives emphasise how ectogenesis would promote women’s negative freedom, i.e. 
‘freedom from’ the restricting effects of pregnancy and childbirth.  
A second way in which ectogenesis would promote women’s freedom is by expanding their 
range of significant options to pursue parenthood projects [2,14,15]. According to this view, 
this practice would represent an “enhancement of individual freedom” [2] and would be “in the 
best interests of women” [14] as it would provide an alternative way to gestate and birth 
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children. This additional option would promote the freedom of all women, but it would be 
particularly beneficial for those women who would not be able or would not want to gestate 
and birth children otherwise [15]. For instance, women for whom gestating and birthing is 
potentially highly risky or life-threatening could use ectogenesis to fulfil their parenthood 
projects [8]. This practice would also enable women whose social circumstances make 
gestation and childbirth either undesirable or impossible to have genetically related children. 
Among these women are for instance those whose professions are either incompatible with 
gestating children or would expose their pregnancies to high risks. As noted by Julien Murphy, 
women who are smokers, drug users, casual drinkers and “do not wish to alter their behavior 
or place [their] fetus at risk” could also benefit from ectogenesis [16]. These views emphasise 
how this practice would promote women’s positive freedom, namely the ‘freedom to’ beget 
children in ways that would not otherwise be possible. Authors advancing them directly or 
indirectly refer to the positive effects on and enhancement of women’s reproductive freedom, 
namely the freedom to decide whether or not to have children and how to have children. While 
reproductive freedom is often conceptualised in negative-freedom terms [27] (i.e. in terms of 
freedom from external interferences in reproductive decisions), ectogenesis would promote 
women’s positive reproductive freedom by enabling them to beget children in the way they 
deem fit.  
 
THE PROBLEM WITH DEFENCES OF ECTOGENESIS  
Arguments emphasising the equality-promoting and the freedom-promoting potential of 
ectogenesis ground positive cases for this practice from the perspective of women. If these 
arguments are convincing, those committed to improving women’s equality and freedom 
should prima facie welcome this practice. I am personally and academically committed to, and 
in favour of, measures that promote equality and freedom. I am also in normative agreement 
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with both sets of arguments. What I contend in what follows, however, is that these defences 
of ectogenesis are limited in their reach and in their scope. Concerning their limited reach, I 
argue that while equality-promoting and freedom-promoting arguments are framed in terms of 
enhanced equality and freedom for (all) women, ectogenesis will likely benefit only a small 
subset of women and not the group in the most pressing need of equality and freedom. 
Concerning their limited scope, I argue that these defences do not pay sufficient attention to 
the context in which ectogenesis would be developed and to current societal, cultural and 
labouring arrangements. As a result, they risk leaving the status quo unchanged. 
 
Equality and Freedom, But for Whom? 
Ectogenesis is considered to be equality-promoting on two accounts: it promotes equality 
between men and women, and between biologically and socially infertile and fertile women. 
Despite this depiction, the reach of defences of ectogenesis appears limited. While health-
related risks, burdens and deaths caused by gestation and childbirth affect all women and can 
indeed be framed in terms of a ‘natural inequality’ [9], they are not equally distributed among 
all women. Documented evidence shows that women belonging to ethnic minorities, poor and 
disabled women are at a much higher risk of experiencing complications during gestation and 
childbirth and of dying as a result of these complications [20,30–33]. This disparity in the 
distribution of the burdens and risks of gestating and birthing children among well-off, white 
and able women and other women can be witnessed both within and between countries 
[19,23,28,29].  
Now, one could argue that for ectogenesis to be equality-promoting, these groups may just 
need to be prioritised in their access to this practice (or at least their access to this practice 
would have to be secured). This would at least represent an incremental improvement of the 
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status quo. There are, however, two sorts of barriers to achieving this: financial and cultural. 
Concerning financial barriers, Kendal’s central claim in her defence of ectogenesis is that this 
practice should be state-sponsored to promote and secure equal opportunities for women. 
Similarly, Smajdor argues that natural inequalities “may generate a prima facie right to 
restitution” [9]. Both defences of ectogenesis hence take into consideration the potential 
financial constraints of developing this practice and the need for sponsoring it to enable 
equality-promotion for all women. The problem with these arguments is that even in developed 
countries with state-sponsored healthcare systems, some prioritisation decisions need to 
happen. For instance, in the U.K., in vitro fertilisation is state-sponsored between one and three 
cycles, depending on one’s geographical region4[8,9]. This means that if after the number of 
cycles paid for by the National Health Service (NHS) no pregnancy can be established, the 
prospective parents must either turn to other methods to have children or attempt more cycles 
using their own resources. Decisions concerning resource allocation and prioritisation mean 
that firstly, even in developed countries with state-sponsored healthcare systems, it is unlikely 
that all biologically and socially infertile women would be granted free access to ectogenesis. 
For instance, it is not impossible to foresee a scenario where the former group would be 
prioritised over the latter, thereby achieving only partial equality with men and with other 
(fertile) women. Secondly, in developing countries and in countries without state-sponsored 
healthcare systems, some (well-off) women would be able to access ectogenesis, while for the 
majority this practice would remain out of (financial) reach. Now one could argue that this is 
unjust and that a concern for justice would require a redress of these disparities [8,9]. 
Alternatively, one could argue that state-sponsoring ectogenesis for all women may turn out to 
be cost-effective from a healthcare spending point of view [8]. It is important to note that both 
 
4 See for instance data from Fertility Fairness at: http://www.fertilityfairness.co.uk/nhs-fertility-services/ivf-
provision-in-england/. 
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these claims raise empirical questions that would need to be addressed for these claims to 
succeed. Addressing these questions is outside the scope of this paper. However, while I agree 
with Smajdor and Kendal on normative aspects of their proposals, I am sceptical as to their 
feasibility. The ways in which assisted reproductive technologies are currently offered in a 
developed country with state-sponsored assisted reproduction seems to provide a prima facie 
reason to be sceptical that ectogenesis would be widely accessible and would hence serve as a 
truly universal leveller.  
As mentioned above, the second barrier is cultural. Assisted reproductive technologies have 
often been criticised for being designed for and mostly accessed by white and well-off women 
[34]. While I do not consider this as a conclusive normative argument against developing and 
implementing assisted reproductive technologies, it is relevant for the present discussion as 
poor women and women of colour have been shown to be among the least common users of 
these technologies [34–37]. Values surrounding assisted reproductive technologies and 
infertility, as well as cultural understandings of them could change. But, at present, it seems 
that ectogenesis would be accessed by—and promote the equality of —only certain women 
[38]. Further, within equality-promoting and freedom-promoting arguments in favour of 
ectogenesis, the universal desirability of ends such as career advancements is taken as a given. 
Despite this, it is unclear whether all women would value these ends and whether women who 
find meaning and self-realisation in gestation and childbirth would necessarily connotate these 
experiences in such negative terms. Arguably, underlining claims of proponents of ectogenesis 
are conceptions of ‘the good life’ that not all women are likely to subscribe to. For many, these 
conceptions would seem ‘WEIRD’, namely reflecting the value systems and preferences of 
‘Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD)’ societies [39]. Defenders 
of ectogenesis note this and contend that this practice would not be imposed on women. 
However, this means on the one hand that ectogenesis furthers the interests and preferences of 
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only some women; on the other, that it may end up undermining women who find meaning and 
self-fulfilment in gestation and childbirth. Their decisions to beget and birth children 
‘naturally’ may be regarded as at odds with conceptions of the good life such as those advanced 
by proponents of ectogenesis, making opting out increasingly difficult. Ectogenesis might 
hence not turn out to be equality-promoting, but rather “increase divisions of class within the 
sexes, as well as maintaining gender differences for some groups in society” [38].  
In addition to defences of ectogenesis emphasising its equality-promoting potential, this 
practice is defended as it could promote women’s freedom from the risks, burdens and invasive, 
autonomy-constraining measures that are often associated with gestation and childbirth. But 
while many if not all women experience these burdens, risks and constraints, the degree to 
which these are experienced varies greatly among women. Both historical and contemporary 
examples of control over women’s (gestating) bodies indicate that control is exercised much 
more on the bodies of disadvantaged members of society, such as women of colour, members 
of ethnic minorities, and disabled and poor women [34,40,41]. For them, ectogenesis might not 
be liberating and might not promote freedom from external interference and control but rather 
become another instrument of oppression. The risk is that certain women, especially from 
disadvantaged groups, would be regarded as substandard gestators. This, in turn, may open the 
door to increased control and pressure to use ectogenesis to secure the safety of the foetus. 
Indeed, ectogenesis could favour a problematic shift of focus from women’s interests to foetal 
interests, depending on who the users of this practice are and on how they are regarded in 
society. Further, as discussed in the previous paragraph, ectogenesis may end up curtailing the 
free enjoyment of ‘natural’ gestation and childbirth for women who find meaning and self-
fulfilment in these experiences. Assisted reproductive technologies such as ectogenesis could 
promote equality and freedom, but whether they turn out to be able to do so depends on the 
conditions under which they become available, on the context in which they are introduced, on 
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who is involved in these processes and on the sort of values that frame their introduction5. This 
brings me to the second limitation that I identify with the defences of ectogenesis outlined in 
the previous sections, namely the narrow scope of these defences.  
 
A Matter of Context  
Ectogenesis is thought to be equality-promoting both at the level of biological reproduction 
and at the level of social reproduction. Moreover, ectogenesis would not only promote equality 
in the private sphere of the home but also in the workplace. While ectogenesis seems to be able 
to promote equality in biological reproduction (albeit not for all women, as discussed in the 
previous section) it is unclear whether severing the tie between biological reproduction and 
women would be sufficient to obtain equality in social reproduction [42]. It seems that more 
than ectogenesis would be necessary to achieve this kind of equality. While it is possible that 
women’s biology and their unique role in begetting children is at the root of their primary role 
in childrearing, this role has been socialised and has become predominant in many societies. 
Granted, values and norms surrounding childrearing can change and the introduction of 
ectogenesis could shape such values and norms. However, one issue must be noted. Other 
assisted reproductive technologies have created new family structures and new ways of 
interpreting social and biological ties [43], but have also reinforced dominant and widespread 
beliefs on the importance of the ‘genetic tie’ [44] and failed to challenge “the existing order” 
[45]. They are: 
 
5 I am indebted to James Fletcher and Guntars Ermansons  for bringing some of these issues to my attention.  
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[I]n no way aimed to challenge the nuclear family, to enable women to be less 
defined by their reproductive capacity, to develop more feminist definitions 
of biology, or to dissolve the patriarchal structures of society [46] 
This is relevant to the present discussion as only introducing a new reproductive technology or 
practice (even one that so radically changes biological reproduction) does not determine how 
and whether such a technology or practice will go about shaping current arrangements, and 
social values and norms. The way technologies go about shaping extant arrangements and 
norms seem to depend more on how these technologies are designed, implemented and 
regulated, and to serve whose interests, than on the technologies themselves. 
In addition to enabling equality in childrearing, ectogenesis is defended as it would allow 
women to equally compete with men in the labour market. Thanks to ectogenesis women would 
be able to access career advancements, certain occupations that were not hitherto available to 
them due to their role in biological and social reproduction and be eligible for professions that 
would be dangerous or impossible to undertake whilst gestating. Defenders of ectogenesis 
rightly point out that the playing field is not level. Despite this, there is a sense whereby the 
benefit of equally competing in the labour market under the current conditions of how the 
labour market is organised may not be beneficial. In other words, the risk is that from the 
‘tyranny of pregnancy’ and childbirth, women would be delivered into the tyrannical hands of 
a flexible, unfair and potentially exploitative labour market. The achieved equality with men 
would end up being the possibility of being equally exploited. Defending ectogenesis as a 
solution to inequality in the workplace is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it locates the 
problem in women’s roles and responsibilities in gestation and childrearing rather than in an 
unfair and exploitative labour market. Ex hypothesis, the obstacles that women face in the 
workplace are the product of a system that does not accommodate (biological) differences, that 
does not favour a free and equal participation of both sexes in social reproduction, and that 
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tolerates oppressive practices. Secondly, such framing of ectogenesis as a means to address 
workplace inequalities calls for solutions that change the way society reproduces itself rather 
than a labour market that prevents equal treatment of men and women. More attention should 
be devoted to changing policies, practices and values that prevent equal access to goods such 
as promotions and pay rises, and that do not incentivise workers to share childrearing 
responsibilities6. It is unclear, then, how ectogenesis would be desirable in this context. These 
shortcomings point to the importance of considering the context in which new (reproductive) 
technologies are developed and offered. In societies characterised by oppressive conditions, an 
exploitative labour market and disparities in terms of capacity to access and enjoy reproductive 
health and care benefits, ectogenesis may not be enough to subvert these features.  
 
ECTOGENESIS AS A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE  
Many of the defences of ectogenesis outlined in the previous sections refer to the work of 
Firestone, one of the first thinkers to discuss the liberating potential of this practice. Sometimes 
they do so by quoting her punchy line ‘pregnancy is barbaric’ [13]. Sometimes they build on 
her cyber-utopia that constructed this practice as one of the means to achieve the liberation of 
women and improve their status in society. Firestone saw in nature the cause of ‘fundamental 
inequality’ whereby “half of the human race must bear and rear the children of all of them” 
[13]. She also noted that “[r]eproduction of the species cost women dearly, not only 
emotionally, psychologically, culturally but even in strictly material (physical) terms” [13]. 
This analysis of women’s begetting capacity returns in contemporary defences of ectogenesis, 
where this practice is presented as a solution to women’s malaises and a means to promote 
 
6 It must be noted that I am not suggesting that interventions aimed at changing social arrangements necessarily 
need to be preferred to those aimed at changing biology. Rather, my argument is that the former set of interventions 
is problematic insofar as it is proposed as a solution to unjust social arrangements and used as a way to address 
such injustice. 
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equality and freedom. Between Firestone’s radical proposal and contemporary defences of 
ectogenesis, however, something important has been lost. Firestone’s defence of ectogenesis 
was not limited to a techno-fix of social, political and cultural problems. Rather, it represented 
one aspect of a much broader proposal to change the labour market, the role of women in 
society and how society was organised more generally. To be truly liberating, ectogenesis 
would have had to be embedded in a comprehensive and radical programme for (feminist) 
revolution, leading to the elimination of (sexual) classes. Firestone dreaded the introduction of 
ectogenesis without a corresponding effort to change the society in which this practice would 
have had to be introduced [47]:  
Though the sex class system may have originated in fundamental biological 
conditions, this does not guarantee once the biological basis of their 
oppression has been swept away that women and children will be freed. On 
the contrary, the new technology, […] may be used against them to reinforce 
the entrenched system of exploitation [13] 
This perspective and the revolutionary undertones accompanying Firestone’s case for 
ectogenesis often do not appear in contemporary defences of this practice. Today, despite 
improvements in women’s standing in society, we are far from the utopian scenarios envisaged 
by Firestone. As I have argued in the previous sections, defending ectogenesis without 
considering the context in which this technology would be introduced may result in promoting 
the equality and freedom of only certain women or in not improving women’s equality and 
freedom altogether.  
At this point, two questions remain open: whether or not ectogenesis should still be defended 
and whether or not it could truly deliver on its equality-promoting and freedom-promoting 
potential. In other words, what value, if any, does ectogenesis have? In this respect, I have a 
proposal to advance. Liberal defences of ectogenesis characterise this practice as a means to 
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achieve greater equality and freedom for women. Despite this, my argument is that ectogenesis, 
alone, would not be able to deliver on these promises. Moreover, this practice may, in some 
instances, end up leaving the status quo unchanged or worsen it. As it is currently defended, 
ectogenesis is a red herring. It distracts from the most urgent and pressing needs of certain 
women and it locates the problem in women’s biological capacities rather than in current 
societal structures and arrangements. Contra these views, I argue that the value of ectogenesis, 
and of defences thereof, lies in the political perspective that it can advance.  
In order to reconceptualise defences of ectogenesis in political terms, Silvia Federici’s [48], 
Mariarosa Dalla Costa’s and Selma James’ [49] readings of the international feminist campaign 
‘Wages for Housework’ provides a useful frame. This campaign began in the 1970s in Italy 
and called for the political recognition of the reproductive labour performed by women in their 
homes (such as housework and childcare). Reproductive labour had to be conceived of as work 
and its active contribution to the production of surplus value recognised [50]. Reconstructing 
what was considered a ‘natural’ female duty as work was a way to claim its belonging to the 
sphere of waged labour and to demand the rejection of both “its devaluation as work and its 
overvaluation as labor of love” [50]. It is a point of contention within feminist scholarship as 
to whether the demand for wages for housework should be taken literally or metaphorically. 
Relevant to the present discussion are Federici’s, and Della Costa and James’ interpretations 
of this demand as a political perspective. According to them, what mattered was not the content 
of the demand, i.e. proposing reformist policies that would extend waged labour to include 
reproductive labour. It was not a demand for money. Rather, what mattered was the political 
perspective and the provocation that the demand advanced. Its political perspective called for 
rethinking, scrutinising and making visible the position of women within the labour market, 
the family and society more generally. It was a demand for performing the analytical work that 
would render visible structures and dynamics that were hitherto not being subjected to critical 
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scrutiny. The demand for wages for housework represented also a provocation. Kathi Weeks 
emphasises this dimension of the demand and its performative power, which was meant to 
elicit “subversive commitments, collective formations and political hopes” [50]. The demand 
for wages for housework was about unionising and joining forces to collectively claim the 
power to change society, it was an “indispensable condition to begin to struggle” [48] against 
the current organisation of labour and society. 
There is something to learn from these readings of the Wages for Housework campaign. To 
deliver on its equality-promoting and freedom-promoting potential, defences of ectogenesis 
need to be conceived in terms of and including elements that advance a broad political 
perspective. This political perspective allows for the scrutiny of and a critical engagement with 
the risks and burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, as well the unfair distribution of childrearing 
responsibilities between men and women. It also enables to critically appraise women’s 
positions in society, their role in social reproduction and the effects of having such role on their 
lives at home and in the workplace. This provides a chance to locate the problem away from 
women’s roles and responsibilities in gestation and childrearing and in the structures that 
prevent their enjoyment of equality and freedom. It also opens up discussions on solutions that 
can be valuable for all women and that pay attention to the contexts in which they are trialled. 
Relatedly, ectogenesis should also be defended as a provocation, one that demands: better 
medical and social services for gestating women; a decrease in the medical hazards associated 
with gestation and childbirth; better working (and living) conditions for future mothers, 
gestating mothers, mothers and women more generally; and a true redistribution of the burdens 
and responsibilities of social reproduction. What is needed, in other words, is a “woman-
centered reproductive agenda that makes visible the needs of all women, particularly poor 
women and women of color” [16].  
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have presented defences of ectogenesis that ground a positive case for this 
technology in its potential to promote women’s equality and freedom. I have argued that —
albeit sympathising with their normative commitments —these defences are limited in their 
reach and scope. Their reach is limited in that they do not account for financial and cultural 
barriers that would prevent all women from enjoying increased equality and freedom. Their 
scope is also limited as they lack an appreciation of the context in which this practice would be 
introduced. To address these limitations, I propose that not ectogenesis as such, but the political 
perspective that it can advance should be regarded as important and defended.   
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